Cómo citar
Resumen
Antecedentes: Diferentes autores discuten que para que el razonamiento pragmático pueda ocurrir, es necesaria la activación de un módulo mental que permite razonar acerca de los estados mentales propios y de los demás, esto se conoce como teoría de la mente. Sin embargo, la evidencia empírica no es concluyente. Objetivo: Determinar el efecto de la teoría de la mente en el razonamiento pragmático de implicaturas escalares. Metodología: Mediante un diseño experimental intrasujeto 2x2 se evaluaron 111 individuos entre 20 y 45 años edad. Se les presentaron estímulos mentalistas y no mentalistas y se midieron los tiempos de respuesta y la precisión de esta según la tarea de verificación de oraciones. Resultados: se encontraron diferencias significativas en el tiempo de respuesta de oraciones pragmáticas de acuerdo con la presentación de estímulos mentalistas vs no mentalistas. Conclusiones: Esto nos permitió inferir que la teoría de la mente cumple un rol significativo en el razonamiento pragmático, apoyando así el enfoque postgriceano.
Referencias
REFERENCES
Astington, J. & Baird, J. (2005). Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford University Press.
Bonnefon, J., Feeney A., & Villejoubert, G. (2009). When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts. Cognition, 112(2), 249-258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.05.005
Bonnefon, J., De Neys, W. & Feeney, A. (2011). Processing Scalar Inference in Face-Threatening Contexts. In L. Carlson, C. Hölscher, & T. Shipley (Eds.), Proceedings of the 33rd Anual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 3389-3394). Austin, TC: Cognitive Science Society.
Bosco, F. M., Tirassa, M., & Gabbatore, I. (2018). Why Pragmatics and Theory of Mind Do Not (Completely) Overlap. Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 1453. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01453
Bott, L., Bailey, T. & Grodner, D. (2012). Distinguishing speed from accuracy in scalar implicatures. Journal of Memory and Language, 66, 123-142. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2011.09.005
Bott, L., & Noveck, I. A. (2004). Some utterances are underinformative: The onset and time course of scalar inferences. Cognition, 51, 437–457. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2004.05.006
Breheny, R., Katsos, N., & Williams, J. (2006). Are generalized scalar implicatures generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role of context in generating pragmatic inferences. Cognition, 100, 434–463. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.07.003
Chevallier, C., Wilson, D., Happé, F., & Noveck, I. (2010). Scalar inferences in autism spectrum disorders. Journal of autism and developmental disorders, 40(9), 1104-1117. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-010-0960-8
De Neys,W., & Schaeken,W. (2007). When people are more logical under cognitive load –Dual task impact on scalar implicatures. Experimental Psychology, 54, 128–133. https://doi.org/10.1027/1618-3169.54.2.128
Gazzaniga, M. (2010). ¿Qué nos hace humanos? La explicación científica de nuestra singularidad como especie. Madrid: Ediciones Paidós.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hochstein, L., Bale, A., & Barner, D. (2018). Scalar implicature in absence of epistemic reasoning? The case of autism spectrum disorder. Language Learning and Development, 14(3), 224–240. https://doi.org/10.1080/15475441.2017.1343670
Horton, W. S. & Brennan, S. (2016). The role of metarepresentation in the production and resolution of referring expressions. Frontiers in psychology, 7, 1111. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01111
Kissine, M. (2016). Pragmatics as Metacognitive Control. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 2057. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.02057
Lopa de Carvalho, A. (2012). Implicatures scalaires: lexique «ou» théorie de l'esprit? (Unpublished master’s tesis). Université Lumière Lyon 2, Lyon, France. http://www.lscp.net/persons/decarvalho/Articles/M1_Lyon_Memoire_de_Carvalho_2012.pdf
Levinson, S. C. (2000). Presumptive meanings: The theory of generalized conversational implicature. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Mazzaggio, G., Foppolo, F., Job, R., & Surian, L. (June, 2019). Guess What?
Comparing Ad-hoc and Scalar Implicatures in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Conference presented in XPRAG.it Behavioral and Neural Evidence on Pragmatic
Processing, Genoa, Italy. https://doi.org/10.3389/conf.fpsyg.2017.71.00007
Mazzaggio, G., & Surian, L. (2018). A diminished propensity to compute scalar implicatures is linked to autistic traits. Acta Linguistica Académica, 65(4), 651–668. https://doi.org/10.1556/2062.2018.65.4.4
Mazzarella, D. (2015). Politeness, relevance and scalar inferences. Journal of pragmatics, 79, 93-106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2015.01.016
Noveck, I. A., & Posada, A. (2003). Characterizing the time course of an implicature. Brain and Language, 85, 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0093-934X(03)00053-1
Noveck, I. & Sperber, D. (2007). The why and how of experimental pragmatics: The case of 'scalar inferences'. In N. Burton-Roberts (Ed.), Pragmatics (pp. 184-212). Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Pedraza, O., Salazar, A., Sierra, F., Soler, D., Castro, J., Castillo, P., Hernández, A. y Piñeros, C. (2016). Confiabilidad, validez de criterio y discriminante del Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) test, en un grupo de adultos de Bogotá. Acta Médica Colombiana, 41(4), 221-228. https://doi.org/10.36104/amc.2016.693
Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salthouse, T. (2009). When does age-related cognitive decline begin? Neurobiology of Aging, 30(4), 507-514. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neurobiolaging.2008.09.023
San Juan, V. & Astington, J. (2017). Does language matter for implicit theory of mind? The effects of epistemic verb training on implicit and explicit false-belief understanding. Cognitive Development, 41, 19-32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2016.12.003
Schaeken, W., Van Haeren, M., & Bambini, V. (2018). The Understanding of Scalar Implicatures in Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder: Dichotomized Responses to Violations of Informativeness. Frontiers in psychology, 9, 1266. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01266
Shannon, C. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. The Bell System Technical Journal, 27, 379-423, 623-656. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x
Southgate, V., Chevallier, C. & Csibra, G. (2010). Seventeen-month-olds appeal to false beliefs to interpret other's referential communication. Developmental Science, 13(6), 907-9012. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2009.00946.x
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1995). Relevance. Communication and cognition. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (2002). Pragmatics, Modularity and Mind-reading. Mind and Language, 17, 3-23. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00186
van Tiel, B. & Kissine, M. (June, 2017). Pragmatic impairment is selective in austim: evidence from quantity implicatures. Conference Presented in The 7th biennual Experimental Pragmatics Conference, Cologne, Germany. Retrieved from https://xprag2017.uni-koeln.de/sites/xprag2017/user_upload/vanTielKissine.pdf
Wampers, M., Schrauwen, S., De Hert, M., Gielen, L. & Schaeken, W. (2018). Patients with psychosis struggle with scalar implicatures. Schizophrenia Research, 195, 97-102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2017.08.053
Westra, E. & Carruthers, P. (2017). Pragmatics development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale. Cognition, 158, 165-176. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.10.021
Wilson, D. (2012). Metarepresentation in linguistic communication. In D. Sperber (ed), Metarepresentations (pp. 411-448). New York: Oxford University.
