Abstract
The issue of abortion is associated with susceptibilities installed in social thought, so it is not surprising that it is so variable regulated by the States, that they seem to have considerable discretion in this work.
In this sense, the present work tries to identify if, according to the obligations imposed by the International Law of Human Rights, it is possible to hold the State responsible when it legally permits the application of an abortion assumption and, nevertheless, makes it impossible in practice. Likewise, in view of the previous premise, it is the object of this publication to analyze whether such a fact may also constitute discrimination against women.
For these purposes, sentences and pronouncements of American and European courts have been compiled, which have been selected in view of their relevance in the object of study. In this way, it has been concluded that States that deny a legally protected abortion request incur responsibility, likewise, it has been determined that this fact constitute indirect discrimination against women when presented as a neutral practice influenced by stereotypes of gender that disproportionately affects the fundamental rights of women.
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